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ARGUMENT 
A. Nature of the case and summary of argument 
This case presents for judicial review a decision by the district court granting summary 
judgment in favor of Respondent, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company ("Deutsche Bank") 
against claims asserted by the Appellants, Plaintiff borrowers Jerry and JoCarol Losee (the 
"Losees") arising out of the enforcement of a Deed of Trust. The instant appeal alleges that the 
District Court abused its discretion by excluding a "Chain of Title Analysis" - a report generated 
by an entity claiming to be an expert in the field of real estate records - as being hearsay, arguing 
that the affidavit executed by Joseph Esquivel, Jr. (the "Esquivel Affidavit") made the Esquivel 
Affidavit and the Chain of Title Analysis "functionally inseparable." The District Court, 
however, correctly excluded the same as the Chain of Title Analysis is hearsay for which no 
exception applied. Ultimately, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Deutsche Bank. 
In this matter, the District Comt did not abuse its discretion when it correctly determined 
that the Chain of Title Analysis was inadmissible hearsay for which no exception applied. This 
was a legally correct finding and did not amount to an abuse of its discretion as the District Court 
recognized the matter was discretionary, acted within that scope of discretion and consistently, 
and made a reasoned decision to allow the Esquivel Affidavit but find the Chain of Title 
Analysis report, itself, to be inadmissible. This was the conect decision, but even if an error had 
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been made, the Losees suffered no harm as the District Court had considered the statements 
made in the Esquivel Affidavit as part of its analysis. As such, the contentions made by Mr. 
Esquivel - for which the Chain of Title Analysis supports - were evaluated when the District 
Court confirmed that no material issue of disputed fact existed. The District Court, therefore, 
correctly ruled and its order granting summary judgment should not be disturbed. 
B. Legal standard 
A District Court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed by this Court under an abuse of 
discretion standard. See e.g., Herman ex rel. Herman v. Herman, 136 Idaho 781, 784, 41 P.3d 
209, 212 (Idaho 2002); Peny v. Magic Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50-51, 995 P.2d 
816, 820-21 (Idaho 2000). "Trial courts have 'broad discretion in the admission of evidence at 
trial, and [their] decision to admit such evidence will be reversed only when there has been a 
clear abuse of that discretion."' Basic Am., Inc. v. Shati/a, 133 Idaho 726,743,992 P.2d 175, 192 
(Idaho 1999)(quoting Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc., 132 Idaho 295, 
304, 971 P.2d 1119, 1128 (Idaho 1998)). As such, a trial court will not be found to have abused 
its discretion ifit "correctly perceived the issue as discretionary" "act[s] within the boundaries of 
its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards" and exercises reason in making its 
decision. Id.; see also State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Idaho 1989). 
Absent a harm which does not affect a substantial right, the Court must disregard any error made 
by the trial court. Idaho Civil Procedure Rule ("I.R.C.P .") 61. 
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C. The District Court appropriately excluded the Chain of Title Analysis in granting 
summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank on the slander of title claim. 
The sole issue presented by the Losees is whether the Chain of Title Analysis was 
correctly excluded as inadmissible hearsay. The Opening Brief argues that the District Court 
eJToneously excluded the Chain of Title Analysis presented by Joseph R. Esquivel, Jr. along with 
a supporting affidavit executed by Mr. Esquivel. See, Opening Brief, p. 5. The District Court, 
however, correctly found that the Chain of Title Analysis "is not an affidavit and the statements 
are not sworn to. Therefore the statements in the [Chain of Title Analysis J are hearsay and 
inadmissible evidence which the Court may not consider." R. Vol. I, p. 179. Despite this, the 
Losees argue that the District Court abused its discretion "by applying a standard of 'hearsay' 
which would exclude virtually all affidavits from consideration on summary judgment" an action 
which exceeded the District Court's boundaries of discretion and which was inconsistent with 
legal standards, and resulted in an action which was not the result of reason. See, Opening Brief, 
p. 7. The District Court, however, properly exercised its discretion in excluding the Chain of 
Title Analysis and its ruling should not be set aside. 
1. The Chain of Title Analysis was hearsay. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence (I.R.E.) 801 defines hearsay as a "statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asse1ied. Evidence which is hearsay is generally inadmissible. I.R.E. 802. The Chain 
of Title Analysis here is an out of comi statement made by Mr. Esquivel which the Losees are 
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using to prove their contention that Deutsche Bank could not enforce the Loan Documents. The 
Chain of Title Analysis, then, falls squarely within the definition of hearsay. The Losees suggest 
that by filing the Notice of Filing of Judicial Review, that the Chain of Title Analysis and 
Affidavit became one and the same. This however, conflates the expert opinion - if indeed Mr. 
Esquivel were determined to be an expert, an issue not before this Court - with the expert's basis 
for that opinion. 
While an expert's opinion may be admissible under I.R.E. 702 and 703, the report itself is 
hearsay for which the Losees do not claim any exception exists. The Losees attempt to conflate 
the two, but both the courts and the mies of evidence themselves confirm the two are separate 
and must be separately admitted to be considered. While the expe1i's opinion may be based upon 
evidence which may be inadmissible, under I.R.E. 703, that does not allow the inadmissible 
evidence to be considered as substantive evidence for the allegations contained in the report. 
Indeed, as this Court has pointed out, I.R.E. 703 "serves to prevent an expert witness from 
serving as a conduit for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence." State v. Watkins, 
148 Idal10 418, 427, 224 P .3d 485, 494 (Idaho 2009). The Ninth Circuit Comi of Appeals, in 
analyzing the corresponding Federal Rules of Evidence have recognized the same, concluding 
that an expe1i's written report is hearsay. See e.g., Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 
1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 1984). 
Here, even if Esquivel was considered to be an expert, his opinion could be - and was -
considered; the repo1i, however, must have a separate basis for admission in order to be 
considered. No such exception exists, and none has been claimed by the Losees. The Losees 
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simply argue that Esquivel Affidavit references the Chain of Title Analysis and so because the 
affidavit was sworn to, the Chain of Title Analysis should be considered on the same basis. See, 
Opening Brief, p. 5. Indeed, even though they were filed roughly a year an half apart, the Losees 
argue the Esquivel Affidavit and the Chain of Title Analysis "are clearly meant to be part of the 
same material." Id; see also R. Vol. 1, p. 106 (Notice of Filing for Judicial Review filed April 
11, 2017); R. Vol. I, p. 24 (Esquivel Affidavit filed as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint on September 14, 2015). By claiming that the Esquivel Affidavit supported the Chain 
of Title Analysis, and not the other way around, the Losees confirm the District Court's decision 
was correct. if the Esquivel Affidavit was not meant as an expert opinion, but was meant to be 
included as part of the Chain of Title Analysis, the entirety of the affidavit should also have been 
found to be inadmissible hearsay. Ultimately, under either scenario, the Chain of Title Analysis 
was hearsay, and while Mr. Esquivel could consider the same in forming his opinion, such an 
action would not serve as a conduit to allow the Chain of Title Analysis to be converted into 
admissible evidence. As a result, the Disttict Comt correctly ruled that the Chain of Title 
Analysis was not separately inadmissible, even if Mr. Esquivel's affidvait would be considered. 
Finally, an expe1i report exceeds the scope of facts which could be judicially noticeable 
under I.R.E. 201. The Losees filed the "Notice of Filing for Judicial Review" in which it attached 
the Chain of Title Analysis in support of the Esquivel Affidavit. R. Vol. I, p. 106. To the extent 
that this was a request that the District Court take judicial notice of the same, the Disttict Court 
was co1Tect in refusing the same. I.R.E. 201 provides that the court may only take judicial notice 
of facts which are "not subject to reasonable dispute" because that fact is generally known or 
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could be easily and accurately detennined by using well established sources. TI1e Chaint of Title 
Analysis does not fall within this narrow category of noticeable facts, and, to the extent tl1e 
Losees's Notice is construed as the same, the District Court was correct in not admitting tl1e 
same. 
2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion. 
A trial comt will not be found to have abused its discretion if it "correctly perceived the 
issue as discretionary" "act[s] within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
applicable legal standards" and exercises reason in making its decision. State v. Hedger, .115 
Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Idaho 1989). The District Court, here, did not abuse its 
discretion and its decision should not be disturbed. 
The District Court correctly confirmed that the decision to exclude the Chain of Title 
Analysis was discretionary where it considered the Esquivel Affidavit but not the Chain of Title 
Analysis. It recognized, then, that the two may be considered independently. Indeed, the Court in 
noting that the Chain of Title Analysis was hearsay indicates that it "may not consider" the 
evidence. R. Vol. 1, p. 179. (emphasis added). The District Court did not say that it "must not" 
or "shall not" consider the Chain of Title Analysis, confirming that the District Court recognized 
its decision was a matter of discretion. 
TI1e District Court also appropriately acted within its scope of discretion and consistently. 
As noted above, the District Court correctly detc1mined that tl1e Chain of Title Analysis was 
inadmissible hearsay, a matter which was squarely within its discretion to do so. See e.g., Basic 
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Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho at 743,992 P.2d at 192. Moreover, the Losees do not point to any 
inconsistent application. Instead, they suggest that the other affidavits presented should have 
been excluded. See, Opening Brief, p. 7. This, however, ignores the fact that the District Court 
did consider the Esquivel Affidavit - it expressly referred to five allegations contained in the 
Esquivel Affidavit in its order. R. Vol. 1, p. 178-179. The District Court only found the Chain of 
Title Analysis - the report itself - inadmissible. Id. This is not an inconsistent application, then, 
as the affidavit was considered by the District Court. 
Finally, the District Court exercised reason in determining to exclude the Chain of Title 
Analysis. The District Court specifically addressed the admissibility of the Chain of Title 
Analysis, noting that: 
Although the Notice states that it supports the "Affidavit of Joseph 
Esquivel, Jr., the Chain of Title Analysis," the Report is not an 
affidavit and the statements are not sworn to. Therefore, the 
statements in the Report are hearsay and inadmissible evidence 
which the Court may not consider. 
The District Court, as a result, considered the admissibility of the document and found that 
because it was not an affidavit and was not sworn to, that it was not admissible - in essence it 
found that the Chain of Title Analysis was not appropriately included in the affidavit. Not only 
was this a correct detennination, but the District Court correctly determined tl1e admissibility of 
the Esquivel Affidavit separately from the Chain of Title Analysis, allowing the fonner even 
though the latter was inadmissible. As a result, the District Court properly and reasonably 
evaluated the same. Consequently, the District Court's actions do not constitute an abuse of its 
discretion, and its decision should not be disturbed. 
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3. Even if the Court committed an error in not considering the Chain of Title 
Analysis, the error was harmless where the Esquivel Affidavit itself was 
considered. 
Significantly, as noted above, the District Court did consider the Esquivel Affidavit in 
making its decision; it only found the Chain of Title Analysis to be inadmissible, as it was not a 
sworn statement. See, R. Vol. I, p. 178-179 (providing a list of five statements asserted in the 
Esquivel Affidavit). As a result, even if the District Court erred in excluding the Chain of Title 
Rep011 the Losees did not suffer any harm to a substantial right. The Court considered the 
allegations contained in the Esquivel Affidavit and found that neither the Esquivel Affidavit, nor 
any other evidence provided by the Losees, created any genuine issue of a material dispute of 
fact. See e.g., R. Vol. 1, p. 180 (finding that the Losees failed show title was clouded, that 
Deutsche had published a slanderous statement through the sale of the Loan or that any defect 
with the assignment would cause a harm to the Losees). Even after considering the Esquivel 
Affidavit, the District Court found that the Losees failed to present any evidence which created 
an issue of material fact. As such, the District Court considered the allegations made by Esquivel 
and correctly found that no material dispute existed. The Losees, then, did not suffer any harm as 
a result of the failure to consider the Chain of Title Analysis report, as the factual allegations 
contained in the Chain of Title Analysis were evaluated as part of the District Court's decision. 
Consequently, even if the District Court did error, the error was harmless and the Judgment must 
not be set aside. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 
Chain of Title Analysis was inadmissible hearsay, and considering the Esquivel Affidavit 
separately. As a result, the District Court's decision should be affirmed, and the decision allowed 
to stand. 
DATED this 21'' day of June, 2018. 
WRJGHT, !NL Y & ZAK, LLP 
;1 
It 
Ace C. Van Patten, Esq. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY C~~ly that I am an employee of WRIGHT, FINLAY & ZAK, LLP and 
that I served on the y of June, 2018, the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to all 
parties and counsel as identified below: 
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